The Ancient Art of Modern Warfare

Ceasefire? (E136)

As I post this, the cease-fires in Lebanon and Iran are still holding, and much longer than I expected. We usually think of cease fires as a good thing, enabling humanitarian activity and at least pause the death and destruction. That is not, however, the purpose behind any suspension in fighting a war. In this episode I examine the real reasons for most truces or cease fires, explore probable motivations for the current cease fires, and ask whether all cease fires are inherently good.

 

Disclaimer:  These podcasts are not monetized or subsidized in any way, nor do they represent anyone’s opinion but my own.

Reference: Clausewitz, C. On War, Book One, Chapter One

Music: Copland, A. & United States Marine Band. (2000) Fanfare for the Common Man. unpublished, Washington, DC. [Audio] Retrieved from the Library of Congress, (Fair use for educational purposes.)

What is a War Crime? (E135)

Every time the United States or Israel use military force, there are immediate claims that those military forces are committing war crimes. I also note that such claims are never made about the opposing side, whether that is Hamas, Hizbollah, Houthis, Iran or any other state or non-state armed group opposing Western armed forces. It also seems that there are voices that insist than any military operation is unjust and constitutes a war crime, at last if the party involved is from the West. Aside from the bias, there is the deliberate use of the term “war crime,” intended to be inflammatory and de-legitimize the accused party, raising images of Nazi and Japanese atrocities of WW2. In this episode I describe what is a war crime under international and U.S. national law. You may be surprised at what is and what isn’t a war crime. I conclude with the claim of Pope Leo IV and the response from the White House.

As usual, the opinions in these podcasts are my own and do not necessarily represent the opinion of the Department of Defense, anyone else in the U.S. Government, or any other organization I am or ever have been associated with. I also want to reiterate that I am not a law of war expert, just a retired cavalry officer for whom the laws and customs of war provided the boundaries of what was allowed and what was unacceptable.

References:

• of Defense, DoD Law of War Manual, June 2015, Updated July 2023
• The Hague Convention (IV) of the Law of War on Land (1907) available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1907&context=ils

 

Music: Copland, A. & United States Marine Band. (2000) Fanfare for the Common Man. unpublished, Washington, DC. [Audio] Retrieved from the Library of Congress, (Fair use for educational purposes.)

Winning and Losing (E134)

The United States is in yet another war. The usual pundits say that we cannot win while others say we have already won. The same people seem to say nearly the same things about Russia’s war in Ukraine. I doubt that pundits in either camp can coherently describe what winning or losing a war means or looks like. So, in this episode, I will once again lean heavily on Carl von Clausewitz to describe what has always been true about winning a war and how that applies to current wars. For the pro-Sun Tzu crowd, stay with me to the end as he makes a rare appearance in my podcasts.

 

Disclaimer: The information in these podcasts is my own opinion and does not represent that of the Department of Defense or any other organization I am or have been affiliated with.

 

Music: Wagner, R. and the USMC Band, Siegfried’s Funeral (Public Domain)

 

Beyond IHL: The Law of Neutrality

I am not sure, but I think that I mention the Laws and Customs of War in about half of my episodes. (Clausewitz, of course features in almost EVERY episode -- except this one.) There is one part of the Law of War that is infrequently discussed. So infrequent that the term International Humanitarian Law (IHL) doesn’t even include it. The International Committee of the Red Cross even says that it is of little importance! That nearly forgotten part of the Law of War is the Law of Neutrality. I do not agree with the comment in the ICRC’s IHL database tha, “the traditional law of neutrality has lost much of its former importance.” I believe that the armed conflicts between Russia and Ukraine and those in the middle east reveal problems which result when the law of neutrality is forgotten or abused. I believe these conflicts also represent an opportunity to reassert that branch of the Law of War, but only if States and nations have the courage to do so.

As usual, the content of this podcast is entirely my own opinion, and does not represent to position of the U.S. Department of Defense or any other orgaization I am or have previously been associated with

 

References:

 

• of Defense, DoD Law of War Manual, June 2015, Updated July 2023
• ICRC, How does Law Protect in War, p.3 https://www.icrc.org/sites/default/files/document/file_list/icrc-0739-part-i.pdf

 

• International Committee of the Red Cross IHL Databases: https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/hague-conv-v-1907

 

Music: Kiilstofte, P. Freedom Fighters, Machinamasound (Licensed)

 

When the Law of War Fails (E132)

I believe that the Law of War remains valid in modern warfare and is essential to establishing peace after war. Despite that belief we see States such as Russia and Iran and non-state groups such as Hamas operate in a manner that looks like violating the most fundamental aspects of the law of war, including deliberate targeting of civilians, to be an objective rather than a restriction. In this episode of the Ancient Art of Modern Warfare I propose some reasons for this and insist that, in the end, it will be counterproductive to achieving success.

The material in these podcasts are my own opinion and do not represent the official opinion of the Department of Defense or any other organization I have been or I am currently associated with

References:

• “The Law of War: Not Dead Yet,” Episode 56 of the Ancient Art of Modern Warfare
• Clausewitz, C. von, Howard, M. E., Paret, P., & Clausewitz, C. (1984). On war. Princeton University Press.
• of Defense, DoD Law of War Manual, June 2015, Updated July 2023

Music

• Kiilstofte, J., The Cavalry, Machinamasound (Licensed)

 

Operation Epic Fury vs. The Powell Doctrine (E131)

In podcast episode 128, posted just before Operation Epic Fury began, I outlined how I think that an attack on Iran could be just, necessary, and what I perceived as a path to achieve the goals expressed by the U.S. Government in the weeks leading to the start of the war. I did not expect this to be a blueprint for what would actually happen. What I really did not expect was for the conduct of the war to be completely different that that. So different that more than the usual naysayers are questioning whether this war is just at all, or winnable. In this episode I go beyond the Just War Theory I used in my previous analysis, using the Weinberger-Powell model for the use of military force. This model is credited with successful use of American military force in the last decade and a half of the 20^th century. Although it is not, and was never intended as a recipe for success, abandoning its thought process seems to have been a formula for failure.

As usual, the opinions in these podcasts are my own and do not necessarily represent the opinion of the Department of Defense, anyone else in the U.S. Government, or any other organization I am or ever have been associated with. The United States should not commit forces to combat unless the vital national interests of the United States or its allies are involved.

 

Dedication to my sons, 1^st Lt Miles Mayer USAF and PFC Charles Mayer USA. With the commitment to our future military engagements being jus ad bellum and jus in bello.

 

The Weinberger-Powell Doctrine (1984) Promulgated by Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger. Believed to have been written by then Maj Gen Colin Powell, his senior military assistant.

1. The United States should not commit forces to combat unless the vital national interests of the United States or its allies are involved.
2. S. troops should only be committed wholeheartedly and with the clear intention of winning. Otherwise, troops should not be committed.

1. U.S. combat troops should be committed only with clearly defined political and military objectives and with the capacity to accomplish those objectives.
2. The relationship between the objectives and the size and composition of the forces committed should be continually reassessed and adjusted if necessary.
3. U.S. troops should not be committed to battle without a "reasonable assurance" of the support of U.S. public opinion and Congress.
4. The commitment of U.S. troops should be considered only as a last resort.

 

General Colin Powell’s re-statement of the Doctrine in 1992, as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

1. Is a vital national security interest threatened?
2. Do we have a clear attainable objective?
3. Have the risks and costs been fully and frankly analyzed?
4. Have all other nonviolent policy means been fully exhausted?
5. Is there a plausible exit strategy to avoid endless entanglement?
6. Have the consequences of our action been fully considered?
7. Is the action supported by the American people?
8. Do we have genuine broad international support?

If after careful consideration of these questions, the decision is made to commit U.S. military forces, then two imperatives shall apply:

 

1. Clear and unambiguous objectives must be given to the armed forces. These objectives must be firmly linked with the political objectives.
2. When we do use it, we should not be equivocal: we should win and win decisively.

 

Reference: Powell, C. “U.S. Forces: Challenges Ahead,” Foreign Affairs, Winter 1992/93

Music: Kiilstofte, J., The Cavalry, Machinamasound (Licensed)

Revisiting Just Cause (E130)

In the last episode, I said that I would compare we know about Operation Epic Fury against the Weinberger-Powell doctrine for the use of American military force. I need to push that off for a week. Current events – and some pushback from my previous episode – require me to revisit my assessment of Just Cause in our attacking Iran.  I stand by my initial assessment in Episode 128, which I recorded before our attack. In that episode I expressed my opinion that Humanitarian Intervention was a valid argument for both Just Cause and Last Resort. Nonetheless, I included a caveat from that episode where I said that the reality of a military operation against Iran would probably look different than what I proposed. It has, and so a review is important.

The information in this podcast is my own opinion and does not represent the views of the U.S. Department of Defense or any other organization I am or have previously been associated with.

• Holst, G. The Planets: Mars Bringer of War, downloaded from Internet Archive
• Kiilstofte, J., The Cavalry, Machinamasound (Licensed)

The Persian Problem in Practice

I keep on trying to podcast about other things and current events keep distracting me. In my previous episode in this series, “The Persian Problem, I described some conditions under which U.S. military action against Iran would meet the Jus Ad Bellum criteria of Just War Theory. That description was, at the time I posted it, theoretical. Now we have the reality of having initiated combat operations. In this episode, I will review what I said in the previous episode and compare it to what we can see so far in this current conflict.

Music:

• Holst, G. The Planets: Mars Bringer of War, downloaded from Internet Archive
• Kiilstofte, J., The Cavalry, Machinamasound (Licensed)

The Persian Problem (E128)

By the time anyone reads or listens to this podcast, the situation with Iran may be completely different than when I write this. In keeping with the intent of this podcast series, however, I thought it might be worthwhile to explore the possibility of intervention in Iran in a way that is in line with the enduring principles of war. In doing this I am not advocating such an intervention. Neither do I express any opinion about whether or not it is even a good idea. My intent is to frame a possible military intervention within the framework of time proven successful strategy and Just War criteria. Given the record of U.S. military interventions following the first Gulf War, I am confident that whatever we do regarding Iran will completely ignore that framework.

 

Music:

• Copland, A. & United States Marine Band. (2000) Fanfare for the Common Man. unpublished, Washington, DC. [Audio] Retrieved from the Library of Congress, (Fair use for educational purposes.)
• Wagner, R. and the USMC Band, Siegfried’s Funeral (Public Domain)

 

The Morality of Strategic Bombing (E127)

Can strategic bombing of cities ever be justified? In the previous episode of this podcast series (E126), Col. Altieri said that the air force always considers itself revolutionary. Before I began recording, he cited strategic bombing in World War Two as both revolutionary and consistent with Clausewitz’s concept of making things so painful that the enemy will not continue to resist. I responded, saying that strategic bombing of the civilian population was a war crime and violates Just War criteria. Afterwards, I thought my response might have been hasty. In this episode, I re-look the idea of strategic bombardment, not as we might see it today, but as it was believed during WWII. In any examination of history, we need to see things as they were understood by those making decisions at that time, not from our current perspective.

 

Music: Holst, G. The Planets: Mars Bringer of War, downloaded from Internet Archive