The Ancient Art of Modern Warfare

E87: Identifying the End State

There are more than 110 armed conflicts in the world today.[1] Ending any one of them requires more than a simple cease fire, it requires knowing what each side intends to achieve by the conflict. This is even true when the participants may not fully understand the end state they are seeking. This includes the conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East. Without addressing those desired end states any ceasefire merely gives time for the warring parties to refit for the next battles. Whenever our country starts on the path to armed conflict, the citizens must demand that our government know and tell us, “How does this end?”

These podcasts are not monetized or subsidized in any way, nor do they represent anyone’s opinion but my own.

Music:

• Holst, G., The Planets: Mars, Bringer of War (Internet Archives)
• Traditional, The Army Strings, Garryowen (Public Domain)
• Kiilstofte, J., The Cavalry, Machinamasound (Licensed)

E86: Is an End State Important?

If I initiate a war, it seems logical that I would know why I am starting that war and what I expect to achieve by it. It might also be helpful if I let my opponent know that, too, as it may help limit the intensity duration, and long-term effects of that war. Why that is and how that does or doesn’t reflect reality is the subject of this and following episodes of the Ancient Art of Modern Warfare.

These podcasts are not monetized or subsidized in any way, nor do they represent anyone’s opinion but my own.

Reference: Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Book One, Chapter One

Music:

• Holst, G., The Planets: Mars, Bringer of War (Internet Archives)
• Traditional, The Army Strings, Garryowen (Public Domain)
• Kiilstofte, J., The Cavalry, Machinamasound (Licensed)

 

E85: Naming the Rose Part 5 -- Why don’t we take action?

The Wagner Group is only one of about two dozen Russian sponsored semi-private military companies conducting combat operations in Ukraine, Africa, and elsewhere. If the operations of the companies violate relevant national and international laws, why aren’t criminal charges being filed against Wagner, affiliated entities, and its operatives? I believe that the answer is more political than legal. I address what some of these political considerations may be in this episode of the Ancient Art of Modern Warfare.

Disclaimer: These podcasts are not monetized or subsidized in any way, nor do they represent anyone’s opinion but my own.

Music:

• Wagner, R. and the USMC Band, Siegfried’s Funeral (Public Domain)
• Traditional, The Army Strings, Garryowen (Public Domain)
• Kiilstofte, J., The Cavalry, Machinamasound (Licensed)

E84: Naming the Rose, Part 4 -- Tools for Accountability

If we can agree that Russian mercenary-like organizations do not meet the legal criteria of being mercenaries, nor are they legitimate members of the armed forces, then their participation in combat must be illegitimate and their actions criminal. The question remains how to hold those criminal combatants accountable under law. This episode explores the tools for such accountability.

Disclaimer: The information in these podcasts do not represent the positions of any organization I am or ever have been associated with. They represent no one's opinions but my own.

 

References

• Geneva Convention Relative to The Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949
• International Committee of the Red Cross, Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities
• Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Asset Control; Transnational Criminal Organizations Sanctions Program

Music:

• Wagner, R. and the USMC Band, Siegfried’s Funeral (Public Domain)
• Traditional, The Army Strings, Garryowen (Public Domain)
• Kiilstofte, J., The Cavalry, Machinamasound (Licensed)

 

Naming the Rose Part 3

If the Wagner Group and two dozen or so similar Russian paramilitary forces are not mercenaries, not PMSCs, not militia or volunteer corps, then what are they? If the term terrorist to too vague and a criminal organization insufficient, then what can we call them that facilitates accountability for their criminal behavior? Maybe, jut calling them criminals is enough. In Part 3 I propose calling them for what they are, criminals. I will follow this in the next and final episode of this series by examining the means and methods to hold these criminals accountable and bring them to justice.

 

Disclaimer: The information in these podcasts is my own opinion and does not represent that of the Department of Defense or any other organization I am or have previously been affiliated with.

Music:

• Wagner, R. and the USMC Band, Siegfried’s Funeral (Public Domain)
• Traditional, The Army Strings, Garryowen (Public Domain)
• Kiilstofte, P., Mercenaries, Machinamasound (Licensed)

References:

• Dinstein, Y., Unlawful Combatancy, https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1312&context=ils
• Hague Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land. The Hague, 18, October 1907, Annex, Chapter 1, Article 1
• Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment Of Prisoners of War of 12 August 1949, Article 4

 

 

Naming the Rose, Part 2

If Wagner and similar Russian mercenary-like organizations do not meet the internationally accepted criteria for being mercenaries or Private Military and Security Companies, then what are they? This podcast explores the suitability of other terms, including militia, volunteer corps, terrorist, and criminal organizations. The challenge is to find a term that accurately describes what they are in a way that offers the possibility for accountability under the law.

Disclaimer: The information in these podcasts is my own opinion and does not represent that of the Department of Defense or any other organization I am or have previously been affiliated with.

(In response to comments received, I am trying to keep each podcast down to about 8 minutes.)

 

References:

Hague Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land. The Hague, 18, October 1907, Annex, Chapter 1, Article 1

Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment Of Prisoners of War of 12 August 1949, Article 4

 

Music:

Wagner, R. and the USMC Band, Siegfrieds Funeral (Public Domain)

Traditional, The Army Strings, Garryowen (Public Domain)

Kiilstofte, J., The Cavalry, Machinamasound (Licensed)

E81: Naming the Rose

Whether the infamous Wagner continues to exist or not, the problem they created is only growing. There may be more than 30 Russian paramilitary organizations operating across the world, many of them fighting in Ukraine. At least one has a reputation from brutality and criminal conduct rivaling Wagner’s. But what do we call them? They do not fulfil the definition of mercenary in some international conventions, and they are not PMSCs as understood in internationally agreed frameworks or by the UN Working Group on Mercenaries. Holding them accountable under law requires proper definition of what they are and the legal regime to hold them accountable. This problem is the subject of this episode of the Ancient Art of Modern Warfare.

 

Disclaimer: The information in these podcasts is my own opinion and does not represent that of the Department of Defense or any other organization I am or have previously been affiliated with.

 

Music:

Listzt, F. and the USMC Band, Les Preludes (Public Domain)

Traditional, The Army Strings, Garryowen (Public Domain)

Kiilstofte, P., Mercenaries, Machinamasound (Licensed)

References:

Article 47, Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977. https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/api-1977/article-47#:~:text=Article%2047%20%2D%20Mercenaries,-1.&text=A%20mercenary%20shall%20not%20have,or%20a%20prisoner%20of%20war

E80: Rules for the Use of Force for Private Security Companies

The presence of Private Security Companies, or PSCs, in conditions of armed conflict continues to be an item of concern to the international community. PSCs seem to blur the distinction between combatants and civilians. They use force, but are not members of the armed forces. Rules for the Use of Force, appropriate to PSC tasks and restrictions under international and local national law, issued by a competent authority and properly enforced, can clarify this murky condition. This episode describes procedures and considerations for developing Rules for the Use of Force relevant to PSCs operating in conditions of armed conflict, post-conflict, and complex emergencies. 

 

Disclaimer: The information in these podcasts is my own opinion and does not represent that of the Department of Defense or any other organization I am or have previously been affiliated with. I am not a military lawyer. Everything I know about drafting RUF came from experience doing that, the wise counsel from experts in the US Department of Justice and the DoD Office of the General Counsel, along with some memorable debates in various international negotiations. Once again, special thanks to the memory of Col. Hays Parks, USMC Ret. Thanks also to Capt. Dennis Mandsager, JAGC USN (Ret.)

 

Music:

Listzt, F. and the USMC Band, Les Preludes (Public Domain)

Kiilstofte, P., Mercenaries, Machinamasound (Licensed)

 

References:

The Montreux Document On pertinent international legal obligations and good practices for States related to operations of private military and security companies during armed conflict, available at https://www.eda.admin.ch/eda/en/fdfa/foreign-policy/international-law/international-humanitarian-law/private-military-security-companies/montreux-document.html

 Newport Rules of Engagement Handbook, U.S. Naval War College, available at https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2998&context=ils

Sanremo Handbook on Rules of Engagement, the International Institute of Humanitarian Law, available at https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwjdtL7pue-BAxUovokEHS03DrAQFnoECBAQAQ&url=https%3A%2F%2Fiihl.org%2Fsanremo-handbook-rules-engagement%2F&usg=AOvVaw2Mfr7ljzl1-c6EEgmxJCZ2&opi=89978449

DODD 5210.56 w C1, Arming and the Use of Force, available at https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodd/521056p.PDF?ver=PIvIb3eht0obgolnD0UCEw%3d%3d

UN Office of Drugs and Crime, Handbook on the Use of Force by Private Security Companies available at https://www.unodc.org/documents/Maritime_crime/19-02086_Private_Security_Company_Handbook_Maritime_Crime_ebook.pdf

E79: Rules for the Use of Force

The mission of the US Army is to fight and win our nation’s wars. That, however, is not the only task we ask the Army to perform in potentially hostile environments. Missions such as military support to civil authority, humanitarian assistance missions, and disaster relief are not governed by the law of war, but by human rights law. In this context, military use of force is regulated by Rules for the Use of Force (RUF), rather than the combat-oriented Rules of Engagement (ROE). This episode describes the difference between ROE and RUF, the challenges in drafting RUF that can accomplish peacetime missions and protect our troops, while complying with applicable civilian law regarding use of force and firearms.

Disclaimer: The information in these podcasts is my own opinion and does not represent that of the Department of Defense or any other organization I am or have previously been affiliated with. I am not a military lawyer. Everything I know about drafting RUF came from experience doing that, the wise counsel from experts in the US Department of Justice and the DoD Office of the General Counsel, along with some memorable debates in various international negotiations. Once again, special thanks to the memory of Col. Hays Parks, USMC Ret. Thanks also to Capt. Dennis Mandsager, JAGC USN (Ret.)

Music:

Bagley, E. and The US Army Ceremonial Band, National Emblem, Public Domain

Kiilstofte, P., Mercenaries, Machinamasound (Licensed)

References:

Newport Rules of Engagement Handbook, U.S. Naval War College https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2998&context=ils

Sanremo Handbook on Rules of Engagement, the International Institute of Humanitarian Law https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwjdtL7pue-BAxUovokEHS03DrAQFnoECBAQAQ&url=https%3A%2F%2Fiihl.org%2Fsanremo-handbook-rules-engagement%2F&usg=AOvVaw2Mfr7ljzl1-c6EEgmxJCZ2&opi=89978449

CJCSI 33121.01B Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing Rules for the Use of Force, declassified version available at: https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/FOID/Reading%20Room/Joint_Staff/20-F-1436_FINAL_RELEASE.pdf

DODD 5210.56 w C1, Arming and the Use of Force, available at https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodd/521056p.PDF?ver=PIvIb3eht0obgolnD0UCEw%3d%3d

E78: ROE and the Law of War

How do rules of engagement promote compliance with the laws of war when those fighting war seem to do so without any basic consideration of humanity? I think that to answer this question, we must revisit the laws and customs of war, sometimes called International Humanitarian Law. This includes understanding that not every act of violence in war is a war crime. Effective ROE is a control to manage the risk that the violence inherent to war does not become an excuse for war crimes.

Disclaimer: The information in these podcasts is my own opinion and does not represent that of the Department of Defense or any other organization I am or have previously been affiliated with. I am not a military lawyer. Everything I know about law of war came from staff judge advocates telling me what I couldn’t do or how to do the things I wanted to do without going to jail. Special thanks to the memory of Col. Hays Parks, USMC Ret.

Music: Holst, G: The Planets, Mars, the Bringer of War (Internet Archive: https://archive.org/details/GustavHolstThePlanetsMarsTheBringerOfWar_201709)

Kiilstofte, J., The Cavalry, Machinimasound (Licensed)

References:

• The ICRC Casebook, glossary: https://casebook.icrc.org/a_to_z/glossary/war-crimes
• 18 U.S. Code § 2441 - War crimes

• Geneva Conventions of 1949: https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/geneva-conventions-1949additional-protocols-and-their-commentaries

• Operational Law Handbook, The Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center and School Charlottesville, Virginia, Chapter 5 (2022)